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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE 6. GIBSON, 
Claimant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20501 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
An appeal from a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying claimant's employment benefits. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE G. GIBSON, 
Claimant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20501 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Petitioner, Catherine Gibson, pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and submits the following brief 
in reply to the brief of respondents. 
ARGUMENT 
In point II of respondents' brief, several claims were made 
that were not addressed in the petitioner's brief. 
For the first time in the respondents1 brief, the issue was 
raised that the petitioner had not given the employer notice of 
the circumstances causing her hardship and therefore, had not 
giving the employer an opportunity to alleviate the problem. 
In the statement of facts, on page 4 of the respondents' 
brief, the statement is made that "the claimant made no attempt 
to approach any individual in a supervisory position with regard 
to her dissatisfaction." This issue was not addressed in the 
initial proceeding nor in any of the appellate proceedings of 
this case. 
In the administrative hearing before the Honorable Norman 
Barnes, the question was asked Ms, Gibson "did you discuss your 
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frustration with the management?" The claimant, Ms. Gibson, 
replied, "How could you change a national policy. The management 
could not change that. To stay with the Internal Revenue Service 
would mean that I agreed with it. It is an overall function." 
(R.35) There is no further inquiry as to the steps Ms. Gibson 
took to alleviate this problem through management channels. 
Since petitioner was not represented by counsel at any of the 
administrative hearings, the issue was not addressed on her 
behalf. In fact, it is Ms. Gibson's position that she took a 
number of steps. She talked to her supervisor as well as to 
other individuals in the management of the IRS facility in 
attempting to get this policy changed. This fact is evidenced by 
her knowledge that the directive was a national policy, rather 
than a local one. 
In the administrative hearing, Mr. Barker from the Internal 
Revenue Service is questioned by the judge as follows: 
JUDGE: Do you know what the procedures would be as far as 
changing the internal policy such as the claimant has expressed? 
BARKER: I would say that it would, at our level, it would 
almost be impossible to change the criteria. :.* 
JUDGE: That would be a matter then of going back to 
legislative committees? 
BARKER: That's right. 
JUDGE: ...As far as making such chances? 
BARKER: Yes. 
JUDGE: It would be actually going through the political 
process rather than the employer itself, is that correct? 
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The case at hand is distinguishable from Denby in that the 
emotional and physical problems encountered by Ms. Gibson rise to 
the level that indeed would cause individuals of reasonable and 
normal sensitivity to cease employment. In fact, Ms. Gibson was 
operated on for these conditions, she consulted a physician and 
that physician recommended that she terminate her employment. 
The good cause standard applied in the Denby case seems to 
analyze the degree to which manifested physical and emotional 
problems would cause a person of reasonable sensitivity to 
terminate their employment. In Ms. Gibson's case, the physical 
and emotional problems which she experienced indeed justify 
termination of her employment at the Internal Revenue Service. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '«/ ^  day of September, 1985. 
^ \ ^ Z-
Kftfib M. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Claimant 
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